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Abstract 
Crowdfunding has gained momentum in recent years. Even though an increasing 
amount of research has been devoted to the economic value of crowdfunding 
marketplaces, the interactions and effects among crowdfunding projects have yet to be 
fully studied. The current study strives to bridge this gap by examining the impacts of 
"blockbuster projects" — i.e., overwhelmingly successful projects – on the crowdfunding 
platform. Hypotheses are formulated based on the theory of network effects. Our 
preliminary results suggest the blockbuster projects exhibit positive spill-over effects 
within project category but cannibalization effects across categories. We also find 
evidence of lasting positive/negative network externality within/across 
category/categories. Further analysis suggests that fresh backers who are attracted to 
the platform by the blockbuster projects tend to be more engaged and more active. Our 
research aims to extend the emergent crowdfunding literature by examining network 
externalities among projects. We also provide practical implications for project creators 
and platform administrators.  
Keywords:  Crowdfunding, Blockbuster Effects, Network Externality, Network Effects, 
Economic Value, Innovation 
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Introduction 
Crowdfunding has emerged as a viable alternative for sourcing financial capital for innovation 
(Belleflamme et al. 2013; Burtch et al. 2013; Burtch et al. 2015; Jung et al. 2014; Xiao et al. 2014). 
Crowdfunding platforms allow individual founders of for-profit, cultural, or social projects to solicit 
funding from a great number of backers, often in return for future products, equity, or some form of 
recognition (Bretschneider et al. 2014; Hahn and Lee 2013; Mollick 2013). Since its inception, 
crowdfunding has helped new ventures to raise billions of dollars (Massolution 2012) and the volume and 
amount of transactions continue to increase.  
Recently, the emergence of several overwhelmingly successful crowdfunded projects has attracted 
considerable media attention. For instance, the “Exploding Kittens” project which was launched in 
January 2015 has attracted 219,382 backers who pledged over USD$8 million above and beyond the 
$10,000 fundraising goal, which makes it one of the most funded crowdfunding projects.1 These notable 
projects not only appeal to a great number of new backers to join the platform, but also draw attention 
from existing ones.  
It is widely believed that these overwhelmingly successful projects, which we henceforth refer to as 
“blockbuster” projects, would have a significant impact on the overall crowdfunding platform. However, 
their influence remains enigmatic. In general, there may be two plausible predictions. On the one hand, 
an in-process blockbuster projects may exacerbate platform competition such that other projects’ 
performance would be undermined. On the other hand, other projects may also benefit from the 
blockbuster projects by “free-riding” on the increased popularity of the platform. The objective of our 
research is to examine “blockbuster effect” on the crowdfunding platform, especially the impact of 
blockbuster projects on the funding performance of other projects. Our study aspires to contribute to the 
crowdfunding literature by exploring the influences of blockbuster projects and how network effects 
operate on this online platform. We formulate hypotheses based on existing theory of network externality 
and conduct a project category-level analysis. The preliminary results provide the first empirical evidence 
of both positive and negative network effects in crowdfunding platforms. Our study also offers practical 
implications for project creators as well as design implications for crowdfunding platforms.  
Related Literature 
Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding supports the financing of an initiative, usually in the form of a project or a venture, by a 
large group of mostly unprofessional individuals instead of professional parties (e.g., banks, venture 
capitalists or business angles) (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010). Crowdfunding bypasses these 
traditional intermediaries to raise money by directly “tapping the crowd” on Internet-based platforms 
(Beaulieu and Sarker 2013). To date, there are broadly four types of crowdfunding business models 
(Zvilichovsky et al. 2013): reward-based, loan-based, equity-based and donation-based. In reward-based 
crowdfunding, which is the most prevalent model currently in practice and also the focus of this study, 
project creators appreciate funders by offering rewards as returns for financially backing the project.  
A key feature of crowdfunding platforms is that publicly observable information is recorded and is made 
available for open consumption (Burtch et al. 2013). Facilitated by this feature, some attention has been 
focused on the influence of observable project properties on backers’ behaviors and decisions, which in 
turn affect the performance of crowdfunding campaigns. For instance, the effect of prior contributions 
(e.g., Burtch et al. 2013; Zhang and Liu 2012), geographic and cultural differences (e.g., Burtch et al. 2014; 
Kim and Hann 2014), and crowdfunding platform/campaign designs (e.g., Burtch et al. 2015; Liu et al. 
2014) have thus far been investigated. In particular, Zhang and Liu (2012) found evidence of rational 
herding among lenders, such that projects exhibiting higher funding levels tend to attract more 
subsequent funding; Burtch (2011) evaluated the influence of network scale on prevalence of herding 
behavior in crowdfunding and found that herding was deemed as a negative network externality because 
it was detrimental to the optimality of backers’ decisions. Yet, whereas most recent work has focused on 
the influences among backers’ decisions, whether the performance of one project may affect that of 
another has yet to receive much attention. In crowdfunding platform, which serves as a two-sided 
                                                             
1 See https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/elanlee/exploding-kittens 
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marketplace (Zvilichovsky et al. 2013), both the backer (demand) and project creator (supply) sides are 
equally crucial for sustainable development of the platform. We therefore intend to bridge this gap in 
crowdfunding literature by exploring the influences among project performance.  
Network Effects 
Network effects (or network externalities)2 exhibit in many online markets (Kauffman et al. 2000; Liu et 
al. 2012) where the utility of a product (or service) is (at least partially) based on its combination with 
others (Katz and Shapiro 1994). It depends on the marginal effect that an additional party brings to 
existing parties in the network, whereas this effect is not necessarily attributed to the additional 
newcomer (Asvanund et al. 2004). A large body of research explores network effects in technology-related 
contexts including the computer hardware industry (Chen and Forman 2006), operating systems 
(Bresnahan 2001), application software (Gallaugher and Wang 2002), instant messaging and social 
networks (Sundararajan 2007), and peer-to-peer music sharing networks (Asvanund et al. 2004).  
By and large, much of the existing discussion of network effects has centered on positive network effects, 
where larger networks create more value for participants compared to smaller networks (Brynjolfsson and 
Kemerer 1996; Saloner and Shepard 1992; Strahilevitz 2003). For instance, Gallaugher and Wang (2002) 
found a positive relationship between companies’ market shares and product prices in the software 
industry. That said, some studies have investigated negative network effects as well (Belleflamme and 
Toulemonde 2009). For example, Asvanund et al. (2004) opined that negative effects occur when 
incoming parties tend to merely consume existing resources instead of contributing new resources.  
The literature also distinguishes between 1) direct network effects, when the utility of a product is directly 
linked to its consumption by users such as in a telecommunication network, a phone service affords 
greater utility when more users are connected to the service (Katz and Shapiro 1985); and 2) indirect 
network effects, when increased usage of one product spawns the demand of complementary products, 
which generate increasing returns to the utility of products in its own type (Clements and Ohashi 2005; 
Forrell and Solaner 1986; Gandal 1995; Katz and Shapiro 1986). A classic example of indirect network 
effects is software/hardware products where the demand of software/hardware depends on the supply of 
the other interactively (Clements and Ohashi 2005). Recently, network effects are also prevalent in online 
marketplaces and communities, given that technological advancements facilitate more intensive 
interactions among geographically separated individuals. Particularly in crowdfunding platforms, both 
direct and indirect network effects exist. Direct network effect occurs when backer utility depends on the 
participation of other backers in the same project (Burtch 2011). Indirect network effect is fomented when 
the performance of a project is influenced by that of other projects, insomuch as certain projects may 
impact the overall crowdfunding platform by attracting new backers or increasing platform popularity.      
In summary, our study aims to uncover the influences among projects in the crowdfunding context.  
Specifically, motivated by the “blockbuster project” phenomenon, and drawing insights upon network 
effects theory, we focus on how the performance of these exceptionally successful crowdfunding projects 
impact other projects. In next section, we develop hypotheses about the “blockbuster effect” based on this 
theory. Particularly, the effects within category (i.e., in the same project category) and across categories 
(i.e., in different project categories) will be discussed.  
Hypotheses Development 
Effects within Category 
The emergence of blockbuster projects in certain crowdfunding project category may exert both positive 
and negative externalities to the performance of projects within the same category. On the positive side, 
these exceptionally successful projects increase the size of the project network (Shankar and Bayus 2003), 
insomuch as they are likely to attract new backers into the platform and increase the activeness of existing 
backers, which will concurrently benefit the funding performance of other projects in the same category. 
Simply put, the additional resources (i.e., new backers and more active existing backers) would be shared 
by other related projects (Strahilevitz 2003) (i.e., projects within the same category). Therefore, a positive 
“spillover effect” may occur such that other projects in the same category reap benefits from blockbuster 
                                                             
2 In this paper, the terms “network effects” and “network externalities” are used interchangeably.  
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projects (Boudreau 2012) resulting in higher overall fundraising performance of the focal category. 
On the other hand, a blockbuster project may also intensify market competition by funneling attention 
and financial resources from prospective backers who might otherwise potentially back other projects in 
the absence of a concurrent blockbuster project. If this effect were to occur, it would be more arduous for 
other concurrent projects to achieve expected funding, since a large amount of cash flow will be absorbed 
by the blockbuster projects (Noe and Parker 2005; Schilling 2002). As a result, a “cannibalization effect” 
may arise, resulting in a negative impact on the performance of other projects (Ghose et al. 2006). Within 
the same project category, both positive and negative network externalities are expected to be strong. Due 
to the limited relevant research in crowdfunding and the dual potential impacts, the overall direction and 
extent of influence is enigmatic. Thus, we formulate two competing hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1a: The emergence of blockbuster projects within the category is positively 
associated with the funding performance of same category.  
Hypothesis 1b: The emergence of blockbuster projects within the category is negatively 
associated with the funding performance of same category. 
Effects across Categories 
When a blockbuster project emerges, we argue that its effect on projects in other categories will 
predominantly be negative. Backers who are new to the platform will be inclined to be impressed with the 
overwhelming success of the blockbuster project. Such positive feedback will likely induce them to 
selectively invest in similar projects in the near future with the expectation of backing successful projects 
(Greve 2003), rather than exploring other unfamiliar projects in other categories. They may develop the 
impression that similar projects are more likely to have the same favorable quality compared to others 
(Boudreau 2012). This positive feedback mechanism also happens to existing backers who are attracted by 
blockbuster projects. In this way, the benefits from blockbuster projects are less likely to “spill over” other 
categories. However, similar to the aforementioned reasons, cannibalization effects are likely to persist to 
other project categories. Blockbuster projects may reduce the network size of other categories by draining 
existing backers’ financial resources (Shankar and Bayus 2003), which otherwise could have been 
directed to support those categories. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The emergence of blockbuster projects is negatively associated with the 
funding performance of other categories. 
Lasting Effects 
Further, network effects are expected to not only occur concurrently, but persist over time (Ghose et al. 
2006). Network effects, especially indirect effects, are characterized by the subsequent influences brought 
by new comers (Katz and Shapiro 1994). On crowdfunding platforms, blockbuster projects not only 
increase network size by drawing new backers into the category, but also attracting existing backers from 
other categories. The overwhelming success of blockbuster projects may signal high perceived backing 
utility (Katz and Shapiro 1985), which will subsequently further increase backers’ engagement to the 
community. Thus, both new and existing backers will likely continue to back other related projects (i.e., 
projects within the same category) subsequently as new projects are introduced into the platform. This 
implies that the positive “spillover effect” within category could manifest as well in the following months 
in the focal category after the completion of blockbuster projects. Besides, the cannibalization effect would 
gradually fade away after the completion of blockbuster projects (Dranove and Gandal 2003). Hence, 
lasting effects of positive network externality will show up.  
Similarly, in the situation of cross categories, those who attracted by the blockbuster project may switch 
their backing focus to the category where blockbuster arises. Then similar backing behaviors in the same 
category will follow (Jordan and Audia 2012). This leads to a negative lasting blockbuster effect on other 
categories. Taken together, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3a: The impact of blockbuster projects has a lasting effect within category, 
such that the funding performance of the same category is positively associated with the 
number of blockbuster projects in past months.  
Hypothesis 3b: The impact of blockbuster projects has a lasting effect across categories, 
such that the funding performance of the focal category is negatively associated with the 
number of blockbuster projects in other categories in past months.  
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Data and Empirical Context 
Our data was retrieved from Kickstarter.com, one of the largest reward-based crowdfunding platforms 
currently in operations. Kickstarter.com categorizes projects within 15 broad domain categories: art, 
comics, journalism, photography, publishing, crafts, dance, film & video, music, theater, fashion, food, 
games, technology and design. Using a software crawler, we collected relevant information on all 
crowdfunding projects that were launched before 11/30/2014. Our data covers all projects since the 
inception of Kickstarter.com – 190,845 projects created by 162,797 unique creators. These projects 
collectively received a total amount of USD$ 1.422B from over 7M unique backers.3 The time span of our 
data is from 04/22/2009 to 11/30/2014.  
Identifying “Blockbuster” Projects 
Following the definition of “blockbuster projects”, we need to select a group of projects that are “true” 
blockbuster projects (significantly outperformed than others). Otherwise, the accuracy of estimations 
would be undermined by including projects that are actually not blockbuster projects or excluding 
projects that are indeed extremely successful and influential. Additionally, it should be a small set of 
projects that capture a significant amount of money pledged in the platform, meeting the 
“overwhelmingly successful” trait. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Blockbuster Projects 
Category Num. Blockbusters  (Non-Blockbusters) Ave. Goal Ave. Pledge 
Ave. Duration 
(days) Ave. Backers 
Games 39 517,668.1 2,203,202.0 32.5 24,574.3 
 13,578 37,122.5 14,816.1 30.5 278.7 
            (12.67***)       (150.0 ***) (0.97)         (96.86***) 
Technology 27 223,171.0 1,879,469.0 37.1 12,126.3 
 9,259 91,431.5 18,380.5 31.6 170.1 
                 (0.42)       (100.0 ***) (2.11**)         (49.76***) 
Design 13 104,769.2 3,027,878.0 40.9 17,906.9 
 11,247 29,157.0 16,136.1 32.0 212.0 
                  (1.41)        (77.47***) (2.59***)          (62.06***) 
Film 4 1,687,500.0 3,034,590.0 30.3 42,131.3 
 41281 44,946.7 5,764.8 34.2 63.7 
             (4.22***)       (240.0 ***) (-0.48)         (200.0***) 
Food 2 87,500.0 1,685,425.0 48.5 10,400.5 
 11,088 39,792.9 5,232.2 31.6 60.9 
              (0.042)       (120.0 ***) (1.84*)          (72.49***) 
Art 1 38,000.0 1,226,810.0 30.0 5,030.0 
 15,004 15,895.2 2,907.9 31.8 40.3 
          -       -   -            - 
Comics 1 57,750.0 1,254,120.0 30.0 14,952.0 
 4,968 32,932.6 6,049.6 34.4 130.8 
          -      -   -            - 
Music 1 100,000.0 1,192,790.0 32.0 24,883.0 
 34,258 10,568.5 3,796.5 34.4 55.0 
         -     -   -             - 
Fashion 1 50,000.0 1,053,830.0 45.0 9,226.0 
 8,914 15,083.8 5,195.9 30.5 65.4 
         -     -   -            - 
All 89 390,420.5 2,205,270.0 35.5 19797.9 
 190,756 29088.7 6,427.3 32.8 87.4 
             (4.55***)        (410.0***) (1.71*)         (290.0***) 
Note: t-values of comparisons between blockbuster and non-blockbuster projects are reported in parentheses. 
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
To achieve this, we use the threshold of top 0.05% in terms of pledged amount across all the projects. 
Using this criterion, 93 projects are identified. Further, for each emerged project, we calculate the moving 
average and standard deviation of pledged amount for all the projects that are launched within a 7 months 
                                                             
3 For projects using foreign currencies (i.e., non-USD), the pledged amount was converted to USD using the exchange 
rate for the month when the project was launched. 
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(3 months before and after) time window. We exclude projects whose pledged amount was within 5 
standard deviations from the category-level moving average. 4  Finally, we were left with 89 
overwhelmingly successful projects that account for 13.8% of all fund raised on Kickstarter.com.5 This set 
of blockbuster projects was deemed reasonable in terms of face validity and sample size for statistical 
analysis. Descriptive statistics comparing the blockbuster and non-blockbuster projects are shown in 
Table 1. These blockbuster projects come from 9 categories, which suggests that there were no blockbuster 
projects in the dance, journalism, photography, publishing and theatre categories. The games category 
has the highest number of blockbuster projects (39; 43.8% of our sample).  Overall, games, technology 
and design categories show higher activeness compared to other categories, since the majority of 
blockbuster projects emerged in these categories. Compared to non-blockbusters, the blockbuster projects 
not only have higher pledged amounts but also a larger number of backers.  
Empirical Model 
We conduct a category-level analysis to estimate the overall blockbuster effect on the crowdfunding 
platform. We construct our dataset at the category-month level. For each calendar month, data on 
projects is aggregated by category to operationalize the variables for the econometric estimations.   
Category Performance – The measure of category performance is based on the total pledged amount 
within the category in a certain month (PledgedAmountt). Since data from Kickstarter.com does not 
provide the pledged amount for each day, we took the average across the predetermined funding duration 
(days) for each project to obtain daily pledged amount. So the total pledged amount for each project in 
certain month equals to the product between the number of days within the month the project was live 
and average daily pledged amount. Then the category performance within a certain month is 
operationalized by summing the pledged amounts (based on live days) across all projects except for the 
blockbuster project(s) in that calendar month. 6 We take the log form to account for the skewed 
distribution. Thus, our dependent variable is ln(PledgedAmount).  
Blockbuster Projects – We operationalize the existence of blockbuster projects using the number of 
live blockbuster projects in the focal and other categories (NumBB and NumBBOther). When blockbuster 
projects span over multiple months, for each month, we use the percentage of live days within that month 
with respect to the predetermined funding duration (days). For instance, if a blockbuster project with a 
40-day funding duration was launched on the 20th of the month (i.e., 10 days remaining in the month), 
the measure will be 0.25 (10/40) for that month (and 0.75 for the following month).  
Lasting Effects Indicators – The variables of first order lasting effect of blockbuster projects are 
operationalized by the number of blockbuster projects in the same category/other categories that ended in 
the last month (NumBBEndLast1/NumBBOtherEndLast1). To find out if the lasting effect persists over 
several months, additional variables of higher order lasting effects (NumBBEndLast2/NumBBEndLast3; 
NumBBOtherEndLast2/NumBBOtherEndLast3) are generated in a similar manner. 
Control Variables – Two variables are included to account for competition within and activeness of the 
platform: the number of monthly concurrent live projects in the same category and other categories 
(NumProjects and NumProjectsOther). Besides, category, year, month dummies are also included to 
account for category-specific characteristics and platform maturity.  
Preliminary Results 
Since the earliest blockbuster project we identified was launched in November 2010, we exclude the 
category-month pairs before November 2010, and use the records since that month. Finally, from Nov 
2010 to Nov 2014, we have 735 (49 month × 15 categories) observations in our estimation sample.  
                                                             
4 The rationale here is to rule out those projects that only have absolute rather than relative (in terms of other projects 
around the same period within the same category) extremely high pledged amount.   
5 Accounting for 13.8% of all funds raised on the platform attests to the overwhelming success of these projects. These 
89 projects raised on average USD$2.2M whereas all other projects had an average of USD$6.4K.   
6 The rationale here is that excluding the pledge to blockbuster projects allows us to explore the effect of blockbuster 
projects on other projects.  
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Descriptive statistics for all the variables (excluding the dummies) are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample (N=735) 
 Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Outcome PledgedAmount 1,574,817 1,997,181 4,524 10,931,900 
Blockbuster 
Indicators 
NumBB 0.116 0.424 0 4.200 
NumBBOther 1.630 1.599 0 5.922 
Lasting Effects 
Indicators 
NumBBEndLast1 0.117 0.478 0 5 
NumBBOtherEndLast1 1.638 1.785 0 7 
NumBBEndLast2 0.117 0.478 0 5 
NumBBOtherEndLast2 1.638 1.785 0 7 
NumBBEndLast3 0.114 0.476 0 5 
NumBBOtherEndLast3 1.600 1.799 0 7 
Controls NumProjects 236.2 245.9 3.918 1,226 
NumProjectsOther 3,306 1,509 751.4 8,791 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models are used to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables. For all 
the variables, Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were checked for potential multicollinearity problems and 
were below the recommended thresholds (Belsley et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2013).  
Table 3 shows the regression results. We estimate our parameters progressively by first estimating a 
model with control variables only (Model 1) and then adding the variables of interest from Models 2 to 5. 
As shown in Model 1, NumProjects is positive and significant (β=0.00183, p<0.01), which suggests that 
one more live project will increase the category total monthly pledged amount by 0.18%. Due to the large 
magnitude of pledged amount (Mean: USD$1.57M), the extent of this effect is quite large (more than 
$2,800 for one project). The negative and significant coefficient for NumProjectsOther (β=-0.000151, 
p<0.01) suggests on average, with one additional project launched in another category, the focal category 
will suffer 0.015% decrease in the monthly pledged amount. It shows there is competition for limited 
capital resources across different categories. 
In Model 2, we add the blockbuster indicators. The difference in explanatory power between Model 2 and 
Model 1 indicates that the blockbuster indicators are significant predictors of category-level monthly 
performance (Model 1 vs. Model 2: ∆R2=0.005, F=16.03, p<0.01). The positive and significant coefficient 
of NumBB (β=0.284, p<0.01) lends support for H1a (H1b is rejected). The result suggests that positive 
network externalities exist within category. The emergence of blockbuster projects is beneficial to other 
projects within the same category. Specifically, one additional blockbuster project gives rise to a 28.4% 
increase in the category’s monthly pledged amount, which is a substantial amount at the category level. 
Furthermore, consistent to our expectation, the coefficient of NumBBOther is negative and significant 
(β=-0.0363, p<0.05), suggesting that the presence of a blockbuster project in other categories would 
reduce the current category’s monthly performance by 3.6%. This result supports our arguments for 
cross-categories cannibalization effect. Therefore, H2 is supported. Largely, the blockbuster projects 
benefit related projects but undermine less-related projects.  
Models 3 to 5 investigate the lasting effects of blockbuster projects. We add the first, second and third 
order lasting effect variables respectively in Model 3, 4, and 5. Compared with Model 2, the increased 
explanatory power shows the lasting effects also significantly predict category’s performance (Model 2 vs. 
Model 3: ∆R2=0.001, F=4.42, p<0.05; Model 2 vs. Model 4: ∆R2=0.002, F=5.22, p<0.01; Model 2 vs. 
Model 5: ∆R2=0.002, F=6.68, p<0.01). The positively significant within category lasting effect indicators 
(NumBBEndLast1: β=0.0893, p<0.05; NumBBEndLast2: β=0.109, p<0.05; NumBBEndLast3: 
β=0.0843, p<0.05) illustrate the evidence that blockbuster projects also have positive lasting impacts for 
projects in the same category in the following months. It is possibly because the blockbuster projects 
attract a large number of backers (both new backers and existing backers) who may continue to support 
other projects in the same category (consistent with our expectation). Therefore, H3a is also supported. 
However, the lasting effects of blockbuster projects in other categories are all negative 
(NumBBOtherEndLast1: β=-0.0307, p<0.1; NumBBOtherEndLast2: β=-0.0297, p<0.05; 
NumBBOtherEndLast3: β=-0.0466,	   p<0.01). The lasting effects of blockbuster projects in other 
categories also remain in the subsequent months. Blockbuster projects continuously cannibalize backer 
resources and pledged money in other categories, consistent with our arguments of a larger network size 
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in blockbuster project category. Therefore, H3b is also supported by the results. 
Table 3. Regression Results for Blockbuster Effects 
 DV: ln(PledgedAmount) 
VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
NumProjects 0.00183*** 0.00160***  0.00152*** 0.00145*** 0.00146*** 
 (0.000232) (0.000205) (0.000202) (0.000207) (0.000205) 
NumProjectsOther -0.000151*** -0.000136*** -0.000119*** -0.000124*** -0.000130*** 
 (2.70e-05) (2.64e-05) (2.79e-05) (2.66e-05) (2.67e-05) 
NumBB  0.284*** 0.245*** 0.256*** 0.243*** 
  (0.0557) (0.0536) (0.0543) (0.0546) 
NumBBOther  -0.0363** -0.0293* -0.0349** -0.0516*** 
  (0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0189) 
NumBBEndLast1   0.0893**   
   (0.0438)   
NumBBOtherEndLast1   -0.0307*   
   (0.0159)   
NumBBEndLast2    0.109**  
    (0.0470)  
NumBBOtherEndLast2    -0.0297**  
    (0.0143)  
NumBBEndLast3     0.0843** 
     (0.0413) 
NumBBOtherEndLast3     -0.0466*** 
     (0.0177) 
Constant 15.24*** 15.08*** 15.07*** 15.07*** 15.23*** 
 (0.149) (0.162) (0.169) (0.168) (0.190) 
R2 0.911 0.916 0.917 0.918 0.918 
Observations 735 735 735 735 735 
Note: Category, month and year dummies are included; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Further Insights into Backers’ Behaviors 
From the previous results, it is apparent that blockbuster projects successfully bring in more backers and 
cash flow, but the underlying mechanisms (e.g., backers’ behaviors) remain unclear. Whether the increase 
in the pledged amount merely arises from more backers, or also from the different characteristics of new 
backers is uncertain. Thus, further analysis was conducted to generate insights into backers’ behaviors.  
Table 4. Backers’ Behavior Characteristics 
Type of 
backers 
Average 
total 
backing 
exp. 
Average 
backing 
interval 
(days) 
Proportion of 
serial backers 
Time before 
second 
backing (for 
serial 
backers) 
Variety of 
categories of the 
projects they 
backed (for serial 
backers) 
Average success 
rate of the 
projects they 
backed 
Blockbuster 
-attracted 
(10.01%) 
3.42 382.10 40.37% 191.75 2.5780 0.965 
Normal  
backer 
(89.99%) 
2.40 471.43 29.25% 250.58 3.0222 0.835 
We differentiate the backers’ community into two groups based on whether their first backing activity was 
for a blockbuster project. Several backing characteristics are computed based on the backers’ backing 
history (see Table 4). The statistics reveal that the “Blockbuster-attracted” backers are more active in 
terms of the characteristics: they exhibit higher number of backing experience and backing frequency (i.e., 
shorter inter-backing interval). The proportion of serial backers is higher, and they take shorter time to 
become serial backers. But for serial backers, blockbuster-attracted backers are more focused when 
backing subsequent projects (lower backing diversity), lending support for our argued mechanisms about 
new backers in our hypotheses (more likely to back related projects). Furthermore, they are more likely to 
selectively back projects that are more likely to succeed, showing the tendency of rational herding (Zhang 
and Liu 2012). Based on this, we propose that blockbuster projects benefit related projects through two 
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mechanisms: 1) they increase the network size of backer community by attracting a multitude of fresh 
backers, and 2) they stimulate the backer community by instilling highly active backing activities.  
Future Research 
This research-in-progress presents some preliminary findings relating to “blockbuster effects” in 
crowdfunding. Our future research will extend the current results by pursuing several directions. First, 
given that our preliminary analysis shows some evidences about how relatedness (more related within 
category and less related across categories) affects the blockbuster effects, it may be an important 
extension to examine whether heterogeneous influences exist across different categories because the 
relatedness between different categories varies. The extent of blockbuster effects would depend on the 
degree of relatedness among categories. Second, our category-level estimation suggests that blockbuster 
projects exhibit both positive and negative effects, depending on the relatedness of projects. In future, 
more nuanced estimation from project level will be conducted to identify the impacts on individual 
projects as well the contingent impacts on project characteristics. Third, in order to further identify the 
changes in the network size, additional analysis will be carried on to track the trajectory of two types’ 
backers’ activities. For example, we will next attempt to identify how their backing decision/participation 
activities (e.g., posting comments to projects) are influenced by project properties. Fourth, our current 
analysis only focuses on the effects within a particular platform. The network effects about projects 
outside platform can also be examined. Finally, our current analysis only focuses on showing the general 
network effects in a reduced form model; however, the network effects in two-sided markets are quite 
complex, especially given the plausible mechanism through increased backer activities. In the future, we 
will extend our analysis using structural analysis or more rigorous identification strategies (e.g., 
propensity score matching to address the potential endogeneity concerns about blockbuster projects) to 
provide more accurate estimates for “blockbuster effect”.   
Conclusions and Expected Contributions 
In the present study, we investigate the “blockbuster effect” within a crowdfunding platform. Using 
network effects as our theoretical lens, we empirically document positive network effects within category 
and negative effects across categories. The presence of blockbuster projects would boost the performance 
of related projects but hurt the performance of less-related projects. Within the same category, 
blockbuster projects also exhibit lasting spillover effects. While across the categories, they exhibit negative 
lasting effects.  
Our study bridges a gap in the current literature on crowdfunding by investigating network effects from 
projects’ perspective. Particularly, our study resolves the uncertainty arising from the effects of 
blockbuster projects, and presents empirical estimations of these effects. Further, the positive and 
negative network effects suggest projects on crowdfunding platforms not only compete but also benefit 
each other. The influence is differential to the relatedness between projects.  
Theoretically, our findings also contribute to the growing body of literature that has documented the 
network effects in online market (e.g., Boudreau and Jeppesen 2015). Specifically, examining network 
effects in crowdfunding enables us to discover a contingency framework of positive/negative network 
externality. The direction of network effects is contingent on the relatedness between projects. The 
positive network effects occur when two projects are highly related (i.e., in the same category). Otherwise, 
negative cannibalization effects will emerge. Further, the blockbuster effects show that the addition of one 
unit of some resources (e.g., a blockbuster project) may make a saliently distinctive effect. This is an 
extension to existing research – i.e., the additional one unit of resource is the same – which are primarily 
focusing on interchangeable projects/services.  
Practically, a few of managerial implications can be distilled from our findings. For project creators, they 
could take advantage of the “piggyback opportunity” when a blockbuster project appears, by launching 
their projects in the same category. They can enjoy positive blockbuster effects, and therefore, are more 
likely to achieve fundraising success. Otherwise, when they have a campaign in other (less related) 
category, they should try to avoid launching when there is an existing blockbuster project in progress. For 
platform administrators, they can selectively increase the exposure of some very successful projects to 
attract backers to the platforms who are more likely to become more active backers. The active backer 
community will attract more innovative projects, and further generate more profit for the platform.  
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